Abstract
The difficulty of developing
a theoretical framework for Buddhism in engagement with contemporary social
issues is rooted in the very nature of Buddhism as an ontological discourse
aiming at individual salvation through inner transformation. It is my
contention, however, that the concept of selflessness can become the basis of
a Buddhist theory of social justice without endangering Buddhism s primary
focus on individual salvation.
In this article, I show how the key concept of
selflessness can provide a viable ground for Buddhist social justice by
comparing it with one of the most influential contemporary Western theories of
social justice, that of the American philosopher John Rawls. Drawing on the
bodhisattva ideal and the Buddhist concepts of sickness and cure, I
then demonstrate how selflessness can serve as a link that allows Buddhists to
be socially engaged even while pursuing the goal of individual salvation.
Introduction
The religious goal of
Buddhism is the attainment of inner peace through the experience of
enlightenment; this is often described as liberation or nirvana. The
latter term, nirvana, which was used more commonly by the earlier
Theravada Buddhists, is often translated as a state of being extinguished or
blown out. It refers to the elimination of various mental obstacles, often
called defilements, which are essentially derived from the three poisons of
desire, hatred, and ignorance. Liberation, on the other hand, a term preferred
by the later Mahayahna Buddhists, has a slightly broader perspective, as it
refers not to the elimination of certain states of mind, but rather to the
attainment of wisdom, which is interpreted as freedom both from the bondage of
life and death, samsra, as well as from social and historical bondage.
Because of its emphasis on
individual salvation, Buddhism is often seen as a quietist religion that fails
to consider societal problems. This is, of course, a gross exaggeration.
Mah y na Buddhism s bodhisattva ideal, Pure Land doctrine, and
Maitreyanism, which often appeared in China in times of political instability,
both reach past the individual to relate Buddhist soteriology to society as a
whole. Nevertheless, it is true that, even today, Buddhist thought rarely, if
ever, addresses the topic of social justice in the modern sense, that is, in
terms of such things as human rights, the fair distribution of resources, the
impartial rule of law, and political freedom. As seen in Mah y na texts such
as The Teachings of Vimalak +rti (Vimalak +rti-nirde [a-s ktra), the
oft-mentioned phrase, When one s mind becomes purified, society will also be
purified, (1) tells us that Buddhism has a
rather naive notion concerning social issues: the communal good can be realized
through the promotion
of individual morality.(2)
Of course, Buddhism is
hardly alone in this regard. Almost all of the ancient philosophies and
religions paid scant attention to issues of social justice in the modern sense.
Even Catholicism, which has addressed social issues from early times, did not
concern itself with questions of social justice or use the term in official
documents until the latter part of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it is only
from the eighteenth century that social justice emerged as an important issue in
political thought and social philosophy in the West. The last three centuries
have thus seen the maturation of such key concepts as citizenship, political
equality, and the fair distribution of economic resources.
However, the process of
modernization that drove the development of social philosophy in the West
paradoxically retarded it in the East. Belatedly experiencing modernization as
Westernization initiated by military and economic contact with Western
colonial powers, Eastern intellectuals lost confidence in their native
traditions, coming to see them as relics of the past without relevance to
contemporary problems. As a result, indigenous philosophies and religions, such
as Buddhism, were neglected in favor of the study of Western thought.
This process has only
recently begun to reverse itself. As the East becomes increasingly aware of the
value of its own cultural identity, a new strain of thought is emerging,
interested not only in relating traditional to modern concerns, but also in
reevaluating tradition in search of solutions to the problems of contemporary
society. The so-called Engaged Buddhism, which attempts to address such
issues as the environment, gender inequality and poverty, is one of the more
distinctive contemporary efforts in this area. But it is too diverse to be
considered a single movement, and still too new to have developed a theoretical
framework for Buddhism s engagement with contemporary social issues.
The difficulty of developing
such a framework is rooted not only in decades of intellectual stagnation, but
more fundamentally, in the very nature of Buddhism as an ontological discourse
aiming at individual salvation through inner transformation. Of course, this
problem is not peculiar to Buddhism; all religions must face the dilemma of
balancing the demands of individual salvation and social engagement. For this
reason, I would like to present some tentative suggestions on how the concept of
selflessness, a core doctrine of Buddhism, can be used to form the basis of a
Buddhist theory of social justice without endangering Buddhism s primary focus
on individual salvation. I will begin by demonstrating how selflessness can
provide a viable ground for Buddhist social justice by comparing it with one of
the most influential contemporary Western theories of social justice, that of
the American philosopher John Rawls; in doing so I will suggest that Buddhism
contains within itself the latent potential for a theory of social justice
suitable to the needs of contemporary society. I will then demonstrate how the
concept of selflessness can serve as a link that allows Buddhists to be socially
engaged even while pursuing the goal of individual salvation.
Selflessness and Social
Justice
Does Buddhism contain the
latent potential for a theory of social justice suitable to the needs of
contemporary society? It is interesting to consider this question in light of
the work of the American philosopher John Rawls, in large part because his
extremely influential book, A Theory of Justice, seems to represent the
apex of everything that Buddhism is not. Though designed to achieve social
justice, Rawls s theory is explicitly amoral, in that it assumes no particular
moral inclination in the individual, and it is likewise unconcerned with
deriving an overarching transcendental or religious authority to enforce its
notion of the social good. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate how social justice
can be built upon individual self-interest, and therefore focuses less on
individual behavior and more on the social institutions regulating that
behavior. In its explanatory power and persuasiveness, it is a triumph of
Western rationality.
It is my belief, however,
that Rawls s brand of rational social engineering offers Buddhism an important
chance to clarify its own underdeveloped relationship to the question of social
justice. But in order to do this, we must first discuss Rawls s theory in
somewhat more detail.
In general, Western theories
of social justice begin with the intention to legitimize and ensure the
individual s freedom to pursue his own interests. Such a notion of homo
economicus is not merely a product of the economical and social theories
that were derived from and support capitalist society, but also has deep roots
in the Western tradition prior to capitalism. The individual and society that
serve as the background for Rawls s theory of social justice represent the
individual in the pursuit of self-interest, and the society that consists of
such individuals. For Rawls, justice is not a virtue handed down to human beings
a priori, but rather a general condition that is needed to maintain the
society. According to Rawls, although a society is a cooperative venture for
mutual advantage, it is typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of
interests (Rawls 1971, 126). Thus, in order to settle the conflicts that exist
among members of a society, principles are needed for choosing among the
various social arrangements which determine this division of advantages and for
underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares (Rawls 1971, 126).
However, Rawls recognizes
that the fairness of these principles depends on the fairness of the process by
which these principles can be induced and agreed upon. In order to warrant the
fairness of this process, Rawls postulates a so-called original position for
those charged with inducing the principles, meaning that his ideal
decision-makers are not constrained by arbitrary contingencies or the relative
balance of social forces (Rawls 1971, 120). To ensure this lack of constraint,
Rawls further posits what he calls the veil of ignorance, meaning that his
decision-makers have no knowledge of their own place in the society they are
designing. They could be well or poorly educated, talented or dull equipped to
compete, or possibly not. Rawls believes that this uncertainty as to their own
competitive potential in the social arena would naturally lead his hypothetical
decision-makers to arrive at disinterested rules of social justice that would
protect the less competitive members of society and ensure a fair distribution
of resources to all. To do so would be in their own self-interest. Because of
the veil of ignorance, the strongest motive for fairness is the possibility that
you could be anyone in the community.
In terms of its methodology,
Rawls s theory of social justice is based on ethical constructivism: drawing on
the Western philosophical tradition, particularly Kant, he develops a set of
ethical assumptions while staying within the scope of a strict empiricism.
Nevertheless, I believe that Rawls s work offers some intriguing hints as to
how to construct a theoretical framework for a Buddhist theory of social
justice. It is, of course, not that the Buddhist point of view agrees with Rawls
s theory, but that the Western philosopher s work offers us a provocative way
to relate the timeless, ontological concerns of Buddhism to the phenomenal world
of social interactions. That is to say, it helps clarify the relation in
Buddhism between the focus on self-nature and personal enlightenment an
ontological concern and the need to think about the daily behavior of the
Buddhist practitioner in society a phenomenal concern.
On first glance, the amoral
rationalism on which Rawls bases his theory of social justice might seem like
the farthest thing possible from Buddhism; but further thought shows some
surprising connections. The Buddhist theory of selflessness, when considered in
terms of the individual and his/her place in the community, really becomes
something of great social power: an extended interpretation of selfhood. That
is, in Buddhism, the individual self is redefined to include all other selves
through the theory of mutual interpenetration. And this brings us to an
interesting intersection with Rawls; for if the hypothetical veil of ignorance
and the possibility that I can be anybody in the community is the starting
point for his conception of fairness, Buddhism offers a startling parallel in
the concept of selflessness namely, the idea that I am everybody in the
community.
It is my belief that the
Buddhist theory of selflessness can thus serve as a launching point for a theory
of a rational social justice as persuasive as the one that Rawls suggests. But
for this to be achieved, Buddhism will have to learn how to move away from the
traditional ontological discourse of the s ktras and classical Buddhist
doctrines focusing on self-transformation and the individual s search for
personal enlightenment and into the phenomenal discourse of the social realm
meaning politics, economics, and law. In that sense, the theory of
selflessness, the idea that I am everyone in the community, can become a
theoretical doorway through which the Buddhist thinker passes from the
ontological to the phenomenal realm of discourse.
Of course, the differences
between Rawls s model of social justice and whatever Buddhist model is
eventually developed will be significant. Almost certainly, the Buddhist model
will put less emphasis on social institutions and more on personal behavior,
most especially on such personal qualities as compassion and benevolence
qualities that are seen as contributing to the search for enlightenment.
Indeed, this fact points to a final, inevitable divergence between Rawls s
brand of rationalistic social engineering and Buddhism. For Rawls, the
achievement of social justice is an end in itself, and his philosophical
concerns stop there. Once social justice has been achieved, there is nothing
more to talk about. Obviously, this cannot be the case for Buddhism, focused as
it is on the ultimate concern of personal enlightenment. For Buddhism, the
concern with social justice must ultimately lead back to the search for
enlightenment. The theory of selflessness may serve as a theoretical doorway
from the ontological discourse to the phenomenal, but it must work as both
entrance and exit. Involvement with the phenomenal realm of social justice must
lead Buddhism back to the ontological discourse and the search for
enlightenment.
The Selflessness of the
Bodhisattva: Curing Oneself By Curing Others
As mentioned earlier, I
believe that the concept of selflessness can be used to link the apparently
conflicting goals of social justice and individual enlightenment. But to show
how, we will have to take a step back and discuss the Buddhist ideas of
suffering, the cure of suffering, and the bodhisattva ideal; only then
will it become clear how social justice and the search for individual
enlightenment can actually serve to reinforce one another.
In Buddhism, the process of
spiritual growth is often compared to the healing of sickness. The First Noble
Truth states that life is suffering, but in Buddhism s view, suffering can
be cured if the proper remedy is applied. Suffering stems from our subconscious
desires, which are often referred to as thirst, thus indicating their blind
and vehement driving force. Because of the blind nature of desire in general,
this thirst, which causes the root sickness of human suffering, is often
equated with ignorance. All other diseases are merely symptoms of this
fundamental ignorance. The main symptom is the attachment to external objects
and to something inside oneself, one s so-called self.
Based on this diagnosis, the
Buddha suggested the availability of a remedy. He believed that enlightenment,
or happiness as opposed to suffering, is inherent in the individual, which means
that happiness may be achieved by curing the root sickness within ourselves.
As stated at the outset of
this paper, Buddhism s emphasis on self-healing the search for enlightenment
is the primary reason why it did not develop a mature social philosophy. And
yet, though the Buddha never intended to create a political ideology, he
certainly never ignored other people. Having taught his disciples and helped
them become enlightened, he then urged them to preach to others: Walk, monks,
on tour for the blessing of many people, for the happiness of many people out of
compassion for the world, for the welfare, the blessing, the happiness of
devas and human beings. Let not two of you go by the same way. (3)
Early Buddhists understood
this passage to mean that the Buddha asked his disciples to work for others, but
it was also interpreted as meaning that in order to help others one must first
become enlightened and therefore healed a point made explicitly in a Buddhist
dictum: [O]ne who is sick cannot cure others. As a result, Buddhists,
occupied with the work of self-healing, became relatively passive in the social
arena.
Yet, as stated earlier, it
would be a gross oversimplification to claim that Buddhism is oblivious to the
interpersonal dimension of human experience. The original belief that one who is
sick cannot cure others came to be radically transformed by the
bodhisattva ideal, which appeared in the later phase of Buddhism known as
Mah y na Buddhism. This new religious figure, the bodhisattva, embodied
the new socio-religious atmosphere at the time when Mah y na Buddhism began to
appear in India.
Who Cures?
A bodhisattva, by
definition, is a Buddha candidate who is often referred to in early Buddhist
texts as representing the previous lives of the Buddha. In his many rebirths,
the bodhisattva appeared in various kinds of existences, as an animal or
a human being, and as a noble or commoner. The exemplary life stories of the
bodhisattvas are compiled in the J taka. Mah y na Buddhists,
however, feel that the stories of the previous lives of the Buddha are not
merely a record of the past, but are, rather, exemplary patterns to follow in
the present. Those who emulate the heroic acts of the Buddha in his past lives
can also become bodhisattvas.
For our purposes here, the
crucial importance of the bodhisattva ideal in Mah y na Buddhism is
that the bodhisattva cures himself by curing others. We find the
following passage in the Vajradhvaja-s ktra:
A Bodhisattva resolves: I take upon myself the burden of all suffering, I am resolved to do so, I will endure it & And why? At all costs I must bear the burdens of all beings & The whole world of living beings I must rescue, from the terrors of birth, of old age, of sickness, of death and rebirth. (Conze et. al. trans. 1964, 131)
This is not simply
compassion toward others in need. For the bodhisattva, the essence of the
non-self doctrine, which has been repeatedly emphasized since the beginning of
Buddhism, is that there is in fact no difference between himself and others.
Non-self in Buddhism is not merely the denial of a substantial self,
comparable to the soul in the Western tradition; it also implies a
nondualistic view of me and others, and asserts the extension of one s
own existence beyond the boundary of the self, to encompass that of others.
Others, for the bodhisattva, are nothing more than the extension of his
own existence. He embraces all others as we, which includes not just me
and you, but also them.
The concept of selflessness
thus opens the avenue to social awareness and the necessity of engagement.
Vimalak +rti, a typical Mah y na bodhisattva figure, identifies the
sickness of all living beings with his own, stating, I am sick because all
sentient beings are sick; when the sicknesses of all sentient beings have been
cured, mine also will be cured. (4) For this
reason, he postpones his own enlightenment and chooses to be born again and
again until everyone else attains salvation. The spiritual value of this choice
lies in its active involvement in society and in the notion that society is an
extension of one s own existence. Indeed, Vimalak +rti instructs
bodhisattvas to convert the experience of sickness into something
positive, something that generates wholesome, striving energy:
Because of his own illness, he should take pity on all others who are sick. He should know of the suffering of countless aeons of past lives, and because of this he should think of the welfare of all beings. He should be mindful of the pure life. Instead of generating grief and vexation, he should constantly give rise to striving energy. He should become a king of healing and cure all ills.(5)
Here we see that the
experience of suffering becomes transformed into the potentiality of curing
others: without the experience of sickness one cannot cure another. At this
point Raoul Birnbaum brilliantly states:
[F]or the Bodhisattvas, & experience of illness will not be a hampering factor but rather a catalyst, the ultimate function of which is to stimulate renewed and increased dedication to spiritual work. Instead of causing the Bodhisattva to seek release from his own bodily pains by entering into the bliss of nirvana, illness for him should be a great leveler, reminding him of the essential brotherhood of man inherent in the shared suffering of disease. Conscious of his link to all beings, he should increase his resolve to come to their aid and succor. (Birnbaum 1979, 14)
Indeed, it seems as if the
true bodhisattva actually welcomes or seeks the experience of sickness.
Thus we read in the Vajradhvaja-s ktra:
To the limit of my endurance I will experience in all the states of woe, found in any world system, all the abodes of suffering & I am resolved to abide in each single state of woe for numberless aeons; and so I will help all beings to freedom, in all the states of woe that may be found. (Conze et al. trans. 1964, 131)
Why does the
bodhisattva choose to adopt the suffering of others? How does this enable
him to help them and thus to lead them, and ultimately himself as well, to
enlightenment? It is because only by fully embracing the experience of others,
which naturally entails experiencing their sickness and suffering, can he fully
realize himself as identical to them. The experience of absorbing himself into
their sickness, and of thus realizing his essential identification with them, is
the only means by which the bodhisattva may develop wisdom and
compassion, qualities that he needs in order to show others the cause of their
sickness. Similarly, he may use these same qualities of wisdom and compassion in
order to discover why he himself also suffers.
Obviously, the above
discussion is anchored on the level of soteriology, not social philosophy. The
bodhisattva seeks to cure himself of suffering by gaining enlightenment,
but because of his profound understanding of the doctrine of selflessness, he
realizes that to do so he must first help cure all other sentient beings. This
then entails an active engagement with their suffering, and furthermore,
a willingness to find personal inspiration in the struggle against suffering in
general.
Yet though the concern here
is undoubtedly soteriological, the basis of a nascent theory of social justice
is also clearly evident. All that we need do is move from the ontological or
soteriological level down to the phenomenal or social level. Once we manage this
move, the doctrine of selflessness provides the underpinnings we need, in that
it posits the mutual interdependency of all members of society and the shared
nature of all types of suffering: spiritual, physical, emotional, and economic.
To put it another way: just as Rawls s theoretical founders, in order to assure
the fairness of their laws, are forced to imagine themselves as being
potentially anyone in society, the doctrine of selflessness requires that
Buddhists view themselves as being in fact everyone in society. The
social implications of this viewpoint are of course powerful: her poverty
becomes my poverty; his tragedy, my tragedy. And when
combined with the model of active engagement offered by the bodhisattva
ideal, in which personal health is achieved by helping others, we suddenly find
ourselves with a solid rationale for social action.
What would a detailed theory
of Buddhist social justice consist of? What would a just society look like from
the Buddhist point of view? These are obviously extremely complex questions, far
beyond the scope of this article. My goal here has been to show that these
questions can be asked from a Buddhist point of view indeed, that they urgently
need to be posed and that an attempt at an answer, however tentative, is in
fact long overdue.
Notes
T 475 Wei
mo ch i so shuo ching, 538c. In my translation, I rendered the term fo
t u (buddhak cetra), or buddha-field, as society, which, I
believe, does not deviate much from the original meaning, and gives a better
sense of the original word in the context of this discussion. Return to text
- We might call this perfectionism, and Confucius s notion of justice also belongs to this category. A perfectionist notion of justice has the potential danger of restricting personal freedoms and justifying social hierarchy. It seems to me that perfectionism is one of the characteristics of the classical notion of justice, both in the East and West. Agreeing with Plato, Brahmanical India viewed the purpose of the caste system as the realization of proper social justice. One extreme case of the perfectionist notion of social justice can be seen in the Bhagavad G +t , a classic of Brahmanical India. In the midst of battle, Arjuna agonizes over whether he must kill his brother, even though it is for the sake of justice; the incarnation of Krishna (K [ c G.a) tells him that his duty as a member of the Kshatriya (K catriya) caste should come before individual ethics. It would be worthwhile to note that the Sanskrit word Dharma means both justice as righteousness and duty. Return to text
- I. B. Horner, trans., The Book of the Discipline, vol. IV, 28 (with slight modifications). Return to text
References
Primary Source
T 475 Wei mo ch i so shuo ching, compiled in the Taish M shinsh k daiz Mky M, vol. 14, pp. 537 557.
Secondary Sources
Birnbaum, Raoul. 1979. The Healing Buddha. Boston: Shambala.
Conze, Edward, et al., ed. 1964. Buddhist Texts Through the Ages. New York and Evanston: Harper Torchbooks.
Horner, I. B. 1966. The Book of the Discipline. Vol. IV. Sacred Books of the Buddhist, vol. 30, London: Pali Text society.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
No comments :
Post a Comment