The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment
By Robert Wright
Anyone writing (or reading) about Buddhism faces a critical question. What is Buddhism, really? A religion, complete with supernatural deities and reincarnation? A secular philosophy of life? A therapeutic practice? An ideology? All of the above? Robert Wright sketches an answer early in “Why Buddhism Is True.” He settles on a credible blend that one might call Western Buddhism, a largely secular approach to life and its problems but not devoid of a spiritual dimension. The centerpiece of the approach is the practice of mindful meditation.
By Robert Wright
Anyone writing (or reading) about Buddhism faces a critical question. What is Buddhism, really? A religion, complete with supernatural deities and reincarnation? A secular philosophy of life? A therapeutic practice? An ideology? All of the above? Robert Wright sketches an answer early in “Why Buddhism Is True.” He settles on a credible blend that one might call Western Buddhism, a largely secular approach to life and its problems but not devoid of a spiritual dimension. The centerpiece of the approach is the practice of mindful meditation.
The
goal of “Why Buddhism Is True” is ambitious: to demonstrate “that
Buddhism’s diagnosis of the human predicament is fundamentally correct,
and that its prescription is deeply valid and urgently important.” It is
reasonable to claim that Buddhism, with its focus on suffering,
addresses critical aspects of the human predicament. It is also
reasonable to suggest that the prescription it offers may be applicable
and useful to resolve that predicament.
To
produce his demonstrations and to support the idea that Buddhism is
“true,” Wright relies on science, especially on evolutionary psychology,
cognitive science and neuroscience. This is a sensible approach, and in
relation to Buddhism it is almost mainstream. Over the years, in a
number of encounters, I have found the Dalai Lama and those around him
to be keenly interested in science. Wright is up to the task: He’s a
Buddhist who has written about religion and morality from a scientific
perspective — he is most famous for his 1994 book, “The Moral Animal.”
My
take on Wright’s fundamental proposals is as follows. First, the
beneficial powers of meditation come from the possibility of realizing
that our emotive reactions and the consequent feelings they engender —
which operate in automated fashion, outside our deliberate control — are
often inappropriate and even counterproductive relative to the
situations that trigger them. Second, the mismatch between causes and
responses is rooted in evolution. We have inherited from our nonhuman
and human forerunners a complex affect apparatus suited to life
circumstances very different from ours. That apparatus — which is
controlled from varied sectors of our nervous systems — was created by
natural selection and assisted by genetic transmission over a long
period of time. It worked well for nonhuman primates and later for human
hunter gatherers, but it has worked far less well as cultures became
more complex. Third, meditation allows us to realize that the idea of
the self as director of our decisions is an illusion, and that the
degree to which we are at the mercy of a weakly controlled system places
us at a considerable disadvantage. Fourth, the awareness brought on by
meditation helps the construction of a truly enlightened humanity and
counters the growing tribalism of contemporary societies.
Wright’s
book is provocative, informative and, in many respects, deeply
rewarding. A good example is Wright’s description of his first full
entry into the realm of mindfulness. Arriving at this new mental state
generated in him an intense emotive response and a memorable feeling
that Wright evokes with suggestive but spare prose. It rings true. This
scene lets the reader glimpse the power of mindful meditation and be
intrigued, even seduced, by the transformative potential of the
practice. I found myself not just agreeing but applauding the author, on
a number of passages. A case in point is his unflinching embrace of the
notion of feeling, which he understands as the mental experiences of
physiological states, states imbued with a valence ranging from positive
and pleasant to negative and unpleasant. He is referring to phenomena in the mind,
private to each specific human being and not inspectable by others. He
does not confuse feelings with emotions, which are public and can be
inspected by others. Surprisingly, this distinction between feeling and
emotion is often glossed over not just in popular accounts but also in
the scientific literature. And yet, it is fundamental for the
understanding of how living organisms with nervous systems can behave,
develop conscious experiences and construct individual minds, sociality
and cultures.
Wright
is not as persuasive when he attempts to establish the truth of
Buddhism by considering the circumstances in which feelings arise. He
readily admits the value of feelings as basic guides to the way we run
our lives. For example, feelings can express states of our physiology by
letting us experience thirst and hunger and satiety and pain and
well-being. He designates such feelings as “true” because their
experience is congruent with the organism’s state of need or lack
thereof. But when, in modern life, emotions such as fear and anger are
incorrectly and unnecessarily engaged — for example, road rage — Wright
calls the respective feelings “false” or “illusory.” Such feelings,
however, are no less true than the thirst, hunger or pain that Wright
accepts and welcomes. When we feel road rage, the feeling faithfully
depicts the disturbed state of our physiology brought about by anger.
That feeling is just as true as the feeling of pain after we suffer a
wound. Practical inadequacy is the issue, not lack of truth.
More often than not, we gain from subjecting the recommendations of any
feelings to the scrutiny of reason. With some exceptions — situations
of panic being an example — emotions and the feelings they engender need
to be judged by reason, in the light of knowledge, before we let them
guide our behavior. Even “good” feelings such as empathy, compassion and
gratitude benefit from distance and discernment.
We
can agree that mindful meditation promotes a distancing effect and thus
may increase our chances of combining affect and reason advantageously.
Meditation can help us glean the especially flawed and dislocated
status of humans in modern societies, and help us see how social and
political conflicts appear to provoke resentment and anger so easily.
Over and above the personal benefits of meditation one can imagine that
populations engaged in such practices would expand their awareness of
the inadequacy and futility of some of our affective responses. In turn,
that would contribute to creating healthier and less conflicted
societies, one person at a time.
But
there are important questions to be raised here. How does one scale up,
from many single individuals to populations, in time to prevent the
social catastrophes that seem to be looming? I also wonder if, for some
individuals, the successful practice of meditation and the actual
reduction of the anxieties of daily life is not more likely to induce
equanimity regarding social crises than the desire to resolve those
crises with inventive cultural solutions. Individual therapy and the
salvation of society are not incompatible, of course, but I suspect they
can be easily uncoupled.
Wright
correctly defends the view that the self as director of operations and
decider of one’s actions is an illusion. I could not agree more. But
there is an important distinction to be made between the idea of self as
mastermind and chief executive officer, and the process of
subjectivity. The self appears fragmented, in daily life and in
meditative states, but subjectivity does not break down. It never
disappears, or we simply would be unable to observe the fragmentation in
the first place.
I
would venture that in most meditative states some subjectivity remains,
as representative of the biological interests of the individual. As far
as I can imagine, the complete disappearance of a subjective view would
result in a “view from nowhere.” But whose view would that be, then? And if not ours, how would we
come to know let alone seek such a view, such an emptiness? Mindful
meditation is no stranger to the world of paradox. Is there anything
stranger than discovering the pleasures of not feeling?
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